The creative sector in Massachusetts contributes nearly $30 billion in economic value, accounting for more than 4 percent of the state’s economy. Despite this, a 2024 study by the Mass Cultural Council (MCC) and Diversity North Group found that of the thirty-six creative occupations examined, twenty-eight have median incomes below the state’s living wage. For example, the median income for dancers and choreographers is just $7,074.
“This is people literally starving. Any other sector that had those kinds of numbers, it would be a rallying cry,” Michael Bobbitt, the then executive director of the MCC, told the Boston Globe about the study’s findings.
So, which is it? Are artists starving, or are they an underrecognized economic powerhouse?
The answer depends, in part, on what counts as the creative economy, who is doing the counting, and what they’re trying to prove. Different reports measure different kinds of economic activity, from individual artists’ earnings to the combined output of nonprofit organizations, commercial businesses, and related industries, or the secondary economic impact, such as going to a restaurant after attending the theater. The result is a patchwork of numbers that paint radically different pictures of the same sector. The bigger problem is that since 2017, any unified effort to quantify New England’s creative sector has largely stalled.
The contrasting findings of these reports highlight the difficulty of quantifying labor defined by a characteristic—creativity—compared with narrowly defined, sector-specific outputs. High rates of self-employment, volunteer and hobbyist participation, and gaps in federal labor data further complicate efforts to measure the sector’s economic contributions.
We’ve been told the central problem with quantifying the sector’s labor is that industry leaders can’t agree on what the creative sector is, let alone build the political coalitions needed to advocate for it. “We don’t have a definition for the creative economy that is widely accepted,” Bobbitt told BAR.
But in reporting on the current state of the creative economy, we found that the perception of a lack of an agreed-upon definition obscures a more complicated history.
Massachusetts was once a national leader in developing advanced methodologies for measuring the creative economy. In the 1970s, the state pioneered early efforts to quantify the arts’ economic contributions. By 2000, a coalition of Massachusetts arts organizations, businesses, and researchers developed a “clusters” framework for defining the creative economy that would ultimately influence how the federal government measures the art industry’s contribution to GDP. The work eventually made its way into state policy under Governor Deval Patrick.
But by the mid-2010s, much of that momentum had sputtered. The state’s creative economy director position went unfilled, its policy initiatives quietly expired, and by 2017, regional reporting on creative employment had ceased.
The decline reflects a broader structural problem affecting the material conditions of the arts in the US. Public, private, and nonprofit organizations operate across multiple levels of government and geography, often with competing definitions of the creative economy, varying priorities, and different stakeholders. Without a central agency to coordinate them, no single entity has the authority to set national policy or establish systems or norms for the arts sector. Without the infrastructure to sustain this work in Massachusetts—or New England more broadly—arts advocates and policymakers have increasingly relied on federal data to make the economic case for the sector.
Now the stakes have risen amid the Trump administration’s changes to federal cultural agencies.
In February 2026, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) announced it would effectively discontinue its Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account, produced in collaboration with the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). The final report was released in April 2025 (using 2023 data), meaning artists, arts advocates, funders, and policymakers have lost a key data source for measuring the sector and developing policies and programs to support it. Whether through neglect, shifting priorities, or targeted dismantling, the disappearance of the regular reporting and administrative systems the US arts sector relies on to track its economic contributions has the same result: Industry and policy leaders are left to fly blind.
These losses have left an already fragmented sector with even fewer tools to assess its economic health, track changes over time, or advocate for public investment. How did Massachusetts go from pioneering how to define and measure the creative economy to losing much of the infrastructure needed to understand it? And what can its history tell us about the future of cultural policy at a moment when the remaining infrastructure is increasingly at risk?
Early Cultural Policy Roots in Massachusetts
As the arts in the US face a turning point in the systems and policies that support the sector, an examination of how things became so vulnerable reveals that policy leaders in Massachusetts—particularly in western Massachusetts—made significant contributions to national cultural policy for economic development. And, like history, policy does not always move forward.
Key aspects of US cultural policy designed to support the creative economy at the national level trace their roots to work led by a late 1990s, early 2000s consortium of Boston-based organizations that pioneered a framework for defining the creative economy and a methodology for measuring the art sector’s economic value. The work was so groundbreaking that it influenced the design of the NEA’s Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account, which, for years, served as the default economic reporting mechanism for the arts and culture industry in the US.
The health of the arts is increasingly seen as a bellwether for the overall health of democracy, in the US and elsewhere. Measuring the sector’s impact is, therefore, far from an academic exercise. Data provides the basis for policies that treat a strong creative sector as a bulwark against rising authoritarianism, a way to increase vibrancy and livability in local communities, and an avenue for economic development. “What I envision is [that the arts, culture,and tourism sector] is actually a driver of migration into the state—that, beyond dollars and cents, if policies are in place where creative sector organizations and individuals know they will have freedom of expression, if they are from a group that maybe is getting a hard time from federal policies, that they are welcome here,” said Massachusetts State Senator Paul Mark, chairperson of the Joint Committee on Tourism, Arts and Cultural Development, whose district covers Tanglewood and MASS MoCA.
The history of cultural policy for economic development in Massachusetts emphasizes that while policy reflects the political economy of people and interests coming together in economic, political, and societal contexts, budgets reflect priorities—and those priorities remain a zero-sum game. What people and budgets have in common is that they change.
The term “creative economy” appears to have been coined by Boston native Ralph Waldo Emerson in English Traits, a treatise published in 1856. Emerson used the term to refer to a set of personal traits among the English aristocracy required to maintain British estates, rather than economic impact. More than a century later, Massachusetts picked up this conceptual thread and became one of the first states to attempt to quantify the arts in terms of economic contribution. Commissioned by Governor Francis Williams Sargent (a Republican who served from 1969 to 1975), a study examining 285 nonprofit arts and humanities organizations was published in 1973. “For the first time, this study calculated the economic impact of cultural organizations in a single state through direct and indirect spending,” wrote Douglas DeNatale, director of the Arts Administration program at Boston University, and Gregory Wassall, associate professor emeritus of economics at Northeastern University, about Sargent’s 1973 report in a 2006 New England Foundation for the Arts (NEFA) white paper. Both DeNatale and Wassall are known for their contributions to creative economy and cultural policy research.
But it wasn’t until the 1990s, according to MASSCreative Executive Director Emily Ruddock, that using economic impact to advocate for state support for the arts became “a trend.” The strategy was to put hard numbers in the hands of legislators to advocate for tax incentives, grants, and other forms of state-level investment—to “move off of Mr. Rogers testifying at Congress about the heart part of it, and move to the wallet part of it,” she told BAR.
That 1990s-era shift was, in many respects, a response to the entrenchment of neoliberalism, evolving from an economic doctrine into a political ideology. In a 2008 report titled Defining the Creative Economy: Industry Occupational Approaches, DeNatale and Wassall, along with economist Ann Markusen, also identified the push to quantify the creative economy as a direct result of the culture wars:
Vociferous conservative attacks on the National Endowment for the Arts following the Robert Mapplethorpe and Karen Finley controversies cut deeply into National Endowment for the Arts funding, reductions mirrored in state arts budgets. … Americans for the Arts (AFTA), the national umbrella arts advocacy organization, found that one way to fight waning public support for arts and culture is to help public and private sector leaders—those who affect policy, funding, and shape opinions—understand the economic benefits gained by communities with a vibrant arts presence.
The Reagan administration planned to eliminate the NEA when it came into office in 1981, a political posture that would undermine the agency for decades. Between 1995 and 1997, during the Clinton administration, a Republican-controlled Congress nearly shuttered the agency. While these attempts were unsuccessful, a nearly 40 percent reduction in the NEA’s fiscal year 1996 budget led to steep cuts to state arts agencies, including precursor organizations to the MCC and regional art agencies like NEFA. In 1997, the House approved a spending bill with a provision that would abolish the NEA. While the agency ultimately survived, it suffered “gutting” staff and budget cuts, including the end of grants to almost all individual artists.
Similar dynamics playing out in state politics compounded the effects of federal cuts. In 1996, “The Mass Council had been at the point of almost being zeroed out in the state budget because of the state economy. And so everyone in the arts—or in the arts organizations—felt like we have to start talking economics, and we have to start proving our worth in terms of economic contribution,” said Beate Becker, who managed the MCC’s Cultural Economic Development Program (later renamed the John and Abigail Adams Arts Program in 2004) before serving as director of the Creative Economy Initiative from 1996 to 2003.
“People default to an economic development or an economic impact argument because that’s the currency of policy,” Dr. María Rosario Jackson, who served as the thirteenth chair of the NEA, told BAR.
At the same time, new access to data made it possible to substantiate that argument. “Nineteen ninety-seven was when the IRS first made its list of nonprofits available on the internet,” DeNatale said. Later, with support from organizations such as the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute, the IRS went further and began to digitize 990 tax forms from nonprofits, enabling previously cumbersome nonprofit financial research at scale.
More than a mere “trend,” the economic argument for the arts became prevalent in the late 1990s because the culture wars created an existential incentive to demonstrate the sector’s value, while a Gordon Gekko “greed is good” neoliberal zeitgeist made economics the currency of power and politics. For the first time, the internet and digitization made it technologically possible to gather the information needed to make this case.
The Early 2000s and the New England Council
Against this backdrop, a chance encounter helped bring the economic impact argument to Boston. “Nancy Perkins, who at the time was the director of development at the [Boston Symphony Orchestra], happened to run into Larry Zabar, the executive vice president of the New England Council since 1989, in an elevator,” Gerrit Petersen, former director of foundation support at the Boston Symphony Orchestra (BSO), told BAR. “She asked him, ‘Larry, is there some way that we can quantify the economic impact of the arts so that we can use it as a fundraising tool with corporate donors?’ And Larry picked this up and ran with it.”
Their effort grew out of a persistent concern about how to fund the arts in Massachusetts. “Here’s a conundrum: Massachusetts, not so many years ago, was ranked the second wealthiest state in the country, but ranked about forty-seventh in philanthropy. And as you know, Boston’s not really a city; it’s a big town. That’s its mentality,” added Petersen.
From that conversation, Perkins and Zabar organized a 1998 convening at Tanglewood, co-led by the BSO and regional pro-business lobbying organization the New England Council. Run by James Brett, a former member of the Massachusetts Legislature, the New England Council still has significant sway today. The first convening led to an economic impact study conducted in collaboration with NEFA and the six New England state arts agencies and prepared by economics consulting firm Mt. Auburn Associates. The findings from that first report spurred the New England Council, the BSO, and NEFA to launch a Creative Economy Initiative,1 which would later inspire the creation of a similar initiative under Patrick.
In 2000, the New England Council, the BSO, NEFA, and the MCC, along with the other five New England state arts agencies, formed the Creative Economy Council (under director Beate Becker) to present the first New England Council–led report. This first report, published in 2000 and sponsored by the Massachusetts Port Authority, Northeast Utilities, Philip Morris Corporation, and Raytheon, is credited by DeNatale and Wassall with being the first to measure the economic impact of New England’s creative sector by including nonprofits, for-profit organizations, and individual artists, and with being the first to use the phrase “creative economy” in contemporary usage. Following this first report, the council continued to support research on the creative economy and presented subsequent reports based on its findings.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey previously produced similar reports in 1983 and 1993 that included nonprofits and some for-profit businesses, such as film and TV studios, auction houses, and theaters, but the agency’s definition of the creative economy was much narrower than Mt. Auburn Associates’ framework. Notably, the report did not “measure the cumulative impact of thousands of individual artists in the region who are not working at cultural institutions.” The California Arts Council also produced an earlier report, The Arts: A Competitive Advantage for California, prepared by KPMG Peat Marwick, in 1994. It also used a narrow definition of “the arts,” though it did include auto design and the manufacturing of musical instruments as case studies. While both reports were produced before the first New England Council report, they were “not widely known” at the time and did not influence the New England Council–led report published in 2000, Beth Siegel, founder and strategic advisor at Mt. Auburn Associates, explained.
“The more immediate model for this [work in the creative sector] was medical devices,” said Petersen. It’s easy to take an industry as consolidated as medical devices for granted, but it started with very similar economic impact studies and policy development work. “The New England Council was very involved in that, as [were] the state [and] other private entities, and they got the funding that really launched that industry here in Massachusetts. That was a new economic sector, and Massachusetts became a center of designing and manufacturing medical devices. So, that was sort of the model that we were looking at,” he continued.
The report was considered shocking at the time: It declared, “employment in the [New England] Creative Cluster exceeds that of the software and communications service, healthcare technology and innovation services. … And, not only is employment in the Creative Cluster significant, but it is growing almost twice as fast … as the average rate of job growth in New England overall.”
The impact of The Creative Economy Initiative: The Role of the Arts and Culture in New England’s Economic Competitiveness, the inaugural 2000 report, and its clusters framework for defining the creative economy was groundbreaking. It pioneered the idea of a creative economy years before urban studies theorist and writer Richard Florida popularized—and then faced significant backlash for—his expansive notion of the “creative class,” and a decade before Markusen sketched out her “creative placemaking” concept in 2010, which took hold in philanthropy and urbanism circles.
The New England Council built on its initial 2000 report by publishing three additional reports between 2001 and 2004: A Blueprint for Investment in New England’s Creative Economy (2001), released at a Boston Federal Reserve Bank meeting; An Economic Development Strategy for New England (2002); and New England’s Creative Economy: Employment Update (2004).
The momentum looked promising.
Progress at the Massachusetts State House
Former State Representative Daniel Bosley, who represented North Adams from 1987 to 2011, told BAR that many of the early roots of cultural policy for economic development in the state trace back to the legislature’s response to deindustrialization in western Massachusetts. “I was elected in 1987. Sprague Electric closed down here in 1985. In the North Berkshire economy, of about 10,000 jobs, about 3,000 were connected to Sprague. Everybody had a relative that worked [at] Sprague. So when you lose 30 percent of your workforce, you have to scramble to do something else,” he said. “When I first got into the legislature as a freshman legislator, I got a call from the mayor of North Adams saying, ‘Can you come in and talk to me? I want you to meet Tom Krens. Tom Krens was the executive director of WICMA, the Williams College Museum of Art.”
Krens had a bold idea: repurpose Sprague Electric as a contemporary arts museum to drive tourism, revitalize the economy, and replace lost jobs. “So we spent the next couple of years in the legislature, with the help of Mike Dukakis, getting $35 million for the Massachusetts Museum [of Contemporary Art], and it passed in, I think, March of 1988. We didn’t cut the ribbon until the summer of ’99 because we went through economic downturns and a change in governorship,” Bosley said. The result was Massachusetts’s own “Bilbao effect.” Today, the museum attracts “around 200,000 visitors a year. The last study that they did said that they were responsible for $85 million in the local economy,” he added.
MASS MoCA’s success in demonstrating the transformative effects of state investment in cultural tourism on economic development helped make the case for future legislation. In 2004, the legislature formed the Joint Committee on Tourism, Arts and Cultural Development. In 2006, Bosley and Dan Hunter, former executive director of the Massachusetts Advocates for the Arts, Sciences, and Humanities, or MAASH (sometimes referred to as the precursor to MASSCreative), proposed an act to create the Massachusetts Cultural Facilities Program, overseen by the MCC and MassDevelopment.
“When I became the chair of the Economic Development and Emerging Technologies Committee, we did a couple of different bills in 2006. We passed about a $600 million economic development bill, and we created the first-in-the-nation cultural facilities fund,” said Bosley. (It wasn’t the first in the nation, but it was an early one; Vermont has a program that predates it.) Later, Bosley and Hunter worked on a 2010 act allowing cities and towns to establish cultural districts. They secured support for these bills from State Senator Stan Rosenberg, who served as the chair of the Ways and Means Committee and later as president of the Senate. “When I went to the Senate, I became the go-to guy for the arts there, except when [State Senator] Bill Bulger was president of the Senate, and he was the real arts guy. When he moved on, I really became the central person on the arts in the Senate,” Rosenberg told BAR.

A collage of newspaper clippings from 2008 to 2009, highlighting how the Great Recession and subsequent government bailouts impacted the arts.
By 2007, enough momentum and support had built for Patrick to campaign on the idea of the creative economy and to formally adopt it into his administration, establishing a state government office dedicated to it. In 2008, amid the Great Recession, Patrick signed into law an act establishing a Creative Economy Council within the Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development and named Jason Schupbach the state’s and the nation’s first director of creative economy. In a press release, the Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development referenced a 2007 NEFA report, affirming the political effectiveness of these studies. It may have also helped that “one of [Patrick’s] main campaign staff and fundraisers was Suzanne Bump,” said Petersen. “At the time, [she] was a rep up on Beacon Hill, and she was on the Government Relations Committee at the [BSO].”
“Sometimes I kind of beat up on myself as the son and the grandson of professional musicians. I should have thought of the creative economy all on my own, but in fact it was an abstract, good policy. The fact is we were in [a] recession, and we were trying to think of all of the ways that we could not just wait for good outcomes, but develop affirmative policy that would help us create jobs and opportunity,” Patrick told BAR. “That’s really where the council came from.”
This local work would soon trickle up to achieve a national impact.
Mt. Auburn’s Creative Economy Clusters Model Goes to Washington
In 2010, Schupbach left the Patrick administration to join the NEA as director of the Design and Creative Placemaking programs. In 2013, the NEA convened an advisory committee to help design a new initiative to measure the creative economy. In collaboration with the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), it developed the Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account. “[The] BEA is the entity that, every quarter, releases numbers on the GDP. We were able to work with them to drill down into thirty-five distinct industries and the arts and cultural production they’re responsible for, and that’s both for-profit and nonprofit organizations,” said Sunil Iyengar, director of the Office of Research and Analysis at the NEA. The account reports national- and state-level numbers using tax data.
A third of the twelve-person advisory group asked to consult on the design of the Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account were New England academics: Siegel of Mt. Auburn Associates, Neil Alper and Wassall of Northeastern University, and Stephen Sheppard of Williams College. Siegel and Wassall had both worked on the New England Council–led reports. While not a New Englander, Wassall and Alper’s occasional collaborator Markusen was also included.
In developing the first report in 2000, Mt. Auburn Associates created a methodology to define the creative economy based on three nested categories: “the creative cluster,” defined as the “enterprises and individuals that directly and indirectly produce cultural products”; “the creative workforce,” defined as those “trained in specific cultural and artistic skills who drive the success of leading industries that include, but are not limited to, arts and culture”; and “the creative community,” defined as “a geographic area with a concentration of creative workers, creative businesses and cultural organizations.” Together, these elements make up the creative economy. “The ways in which [Mt. Auburn Associates] conceptualized it by looking holistically at not just the nonprofit arts and cultural sector, but [also] at creative workers [and] creative industries, the analysis they did was important. [It was a] landmark study for the field,” said Anne Gadwa Nicodemus, founder of Metris Arts Consulting.

Graphics included in the New England Council’s 2000 report, The Creative Economy Initiative: The Role of the Arts and Culture in New England’s Economic Competitiveness, illustrating Mt. Auburn Associates’ creative clusters framework and how the arts sector contributes to New England’s overall competitiveness. These graphics have been enhanced for image clarity and readability; they have not otherwise been altered.
The clusters model was adapted from economist Michael Porter’s research on measuring coexisting, geographically concentrated industry sectors. This methodology overcame several obstacles that had previously kept the sector from being fully measured, including an ambiguous definition of the creative economy, high rates of self-employment, the combination of nonprofit and for-profit work, and regional differences in what counts as arts and culture. This was achieved by rejecting exceptionalism and treating the arts like any other industry sector. “We’ve done studies of the biotech industry. We’ve done studies of healthcare. We used the same methodology to look at the arts,” said Siegel.
“I think there is still a lasting impact because there was this academic legitimacy that went along with those reports. Greg Wassall and Doug DeNatale were part of that cohort of academics who were like, ‘Hey, we have just done something really, really quality [and] academic level.’ It was an anchor that the arts and cultural sector could really rely on to say, ‘OK, here’s our advocacy ammo to say we are really legitimate,’” said Joanna Woronkowicz, faculty director of the Center for Cultural Affairs at Indiana University.
While this may sound academic, it means there is a widely adopted definition of the creative economy. So while some argue that there isn’t one, Dee Schneidman, senior program director at the Research and Creative Economy at NEFA, disagrees. She told BAR, “The NEFA definition has been used by many communities across the country.” The problem isn’t that a definition does not exist; it’s that it’s abstract—because it has to be. “Our definition is not one-size-fits-all; it is flexible. It should be flexible. There is a definition of the creative core, and then in every community, who is surrounding that core—who the related industries are—is going to be site-specific. They’re going to depend on that geography,” Schneidman continued.
“In the US, as opposed to European countries, where there will be a national agency that is responsible for setting policy in the cultural sector, in the US federal system, there is no such body. The National Endowment for the Arts doesn’t set cultural policy for the nation. There’s no single federal entity that can say, ‘All right, this is how we define it.’ So you’re gonna get variation,’’ said DeNatale.
The Beginning of the End
Around 2004, NEFA began leading regional reporting on the creative economy, taking over from the New England Council. It continued to publish reports on jobs in New England at irregular intervals before sunsetting its reporting and creative economy conference in 2017. Without the NEFA report, the Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account report became the sector’s default data source. “When I cite economic data or stats about the sector, I use the federal government data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and [the] NEA,” the MCC’s Senior Director of Policy and Public Affairs, Bethann Steiner, wrote in an email to BAR.
NEFA’s reports contrast with those such as the Otis College Report on the Creative Economy, published annually since 2007. The report, which provides longitudinal insights into how the sector has changed, quickly gained attention for putting quantifiable data to the labor that has long been core to California’s identity. “The cultural sector tends to suffer [from], or be accused of, not having metrics attached to it. I think [the Otis Report] was a way for leadership in cultural departments and for elected officials who care about arts and culture to reference the relevancy of the cultural sector,” said Edgar Garcia, who, at the time of our conversation, was interim general manager of El Pueblo de Los Angeles Historical Monument. In 2025, Otis College updated its report with a real-time, interactive online dashboard, in partnership with Westwood Economics, allowing anyone to review and filter the data underlying the reports.
Even though MassArt is the nation’s first and only independent public art and design college (and had a seat on Patrick’s Creative Economy Council, along with MIT, UMass Lowell, and the MCC), and despite contributions by Northeastern faculty to the field and UMass Donahue Institute’s contributions to NEFA’s 2017 report, Massachusetts has no comparable university-led report. “[Otis] did the report for a specific reason, given the significant industry where they are. They were really addressing a geography,” said Mary Grant, president of MassArt, seemingly implying that Massachusetts does not have a comparable relationship with a creative industry. To organize something similar, Massachusetts would need private funding, she added.
Aside from NEA data, frequently cited data on the arts in Massachusetts come from NEFA’s 2017 Jobs in New England’s Creative Economy and Why They Matter report and the Boston Foundation’s 2016 How Boston and Other American Cities Support and Sustain the Arts report. Both rely on data that is more than ten years old and predate the COVID-19 pandemic, making them too anachronistic to be useful. “Anything that’s ten years old makes no sense. It just doesn’t. The world is completely different. The economy is different. The way we operate is different,” said John Andrews, founder and president of the Creative Collective, a Salem-based business support association.
The legislative act establishing the Creative Economy Council within the state government included a statutory sunset provision set for December 31, 2012. An economic development and competitiveness act passed on August 7, 2012, under the Patrick administration, however, established a Creative Economy Network led by the state’s creative economy director, effectively extending the council’s work until 2016. Helena Fruscio Altsman, former director of the Berkshire Creative Economy Council (commonly known as Berkshire Creative), was named the state’s creative economy industry director in 2011, succeeding Schupbach. Fruscio Altsman’s team declined multiple interview requests, but her LinkedIn profile indicates she held the role until 2014, when she left to enroll in a master’s program at the Harvard Kennedy School. Republican Governor Charlie Baker was sworn in January 2015. During his administration, this position remained unfilled, and by 2019, both the council and the network had ceased operations.
Like the fall of the Library of Alexandria, no single event caused this work to collapse. It was more a corrosive mix of burned-out leaders moving on, resource-reallocation issues, and shifting priorities that led the systems that reported on the arts economy to slouch into the policy dustbin. “This is kind of a phase that is dying out. It’s possibly because those people are now largely retired. So there’s not really that cohort of academics who are giving legitimacy to this idea anymore,” said Woronkowicz.
There were signs that enthusiasm for creative economy policy was already running out of steam before Baker assumed the governorship. “I burnt out. I was just totally burnt out and left,” said Becker, who helped design the 2000 New England Council and Mt. Auburn Associates report and contributed to much of the collaborative’s research. Bosley was no longer the head of the state’s Economic Development and Emerging Technologies Committee. “When I left that committee, the next chair came in and had a different priority. So, a lot of it has to do with personal priorities,” he said. Similarly, MAASH lost a critical grant from the MCC under Executive Director Anita Walker between 2010 and 2011, prompting the Boston Foundation to cease its matching grant and ultimately causing MAASH to shutter.
Thus, New England’s creative economy work, as the saying goes, went out with a whimper rather than a bang. Neither the council nor the network was formally dissolved; they were simply left to expire. Quiet dissolution was aided by the fact that neither had assigned budgets, though their formation acts allowed them to fundraise independently. When Fruscio Altsman returned to state government in 2015, it was with a new title: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Technology.
In hindsight, while Patrick’s creation of a Creative Economy Council signaled that lawmakers were taking the sector seriously as an economic development strategy, bringing it into state government, rather than establishing an independent, government-funded agency like the MCC, left it vulnerable to shifts in administrations’ views, budgets, and priorities. To policy outsiders, it may also have seemed duplicative of the MCC’s work.
The Decay Rots Up
Even before the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, local creative economy efforts were sputtering. In 2016, Baker slashed the MCC’s budget for fiscal year 2017. Citing a loss of momentum and “a needed refresh,” Walker ended the agency’s signature cultural economic development program, the John and Abigail Adams Arts Program, in 2017.
NEFA launched its CreativeGround database in 2014.2 It published its last report on jobs in New England’s creative sector in 2017, and stopped hosting its Creative Communities Exchange conference after 2019. After publishing its 2017 report, the organization decided to use CreativeGround “to focus on being the data provider for Americans for the Arts, and for the NEA, as well as local partners and advocates,” said Schneidman. “We don’t need to commission very expensive studies if AFTA [Americans for the Arts] is doing them, and if the NEA is doing them, down to the state and local level,” she explained. Soon after, the sector lost a key legislative champion when Rosenberg, then president of the Massachusetts Senate and former chair of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, resigned in 2018 following an ethics probe.
Overall, swapping the NEFA jobs report and conference for the self-reported CreativeGround data was a lackluster trade-off. While the national Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account report was produced annually and included state-level detail, the AFTA Arts & Economic Prosperity study is conducted only about every five years, limiting its usefulness. “[NEFA’s annual conference held to present the report] was a really important conference that brought a lot of different people together from a lot of different sectors,” said SueEllen Kroll, senior program officer for Arts & Creativity at the Barr Foundation. “The issue with some of the data that we’re talking about [with regard to] CreativeGround is that it’s a self-directed database, and so NEFA holds the infrastructure for it, but they don’t actually clean it up,” she continued. It also does not appear to be used, as NEFA claims, as a directory for booking artists. “I don’t know anyone that’s ever used that to find a performer,” said Andrews of the Creative Collective.
While Trump has not (so far) succeeded in his repeated proposals to zero out the NEA, budget cuts and personnel reductions have been made. Losing the Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account means AFTA’s quinquennial Arts and Economic Prosperity report is the only national report on the sector left.
Looking back, a picture emerges of a highly brittle national cultural policy system that, lacking coordination and starved for resources, shows cracks at nearly every level of operation: state, regional, and national.
The Creative Economy’s Credibility Problem
These days, efforts to use policy to support and measure Massachusetts’s creative economy seem to be largely stalled.
For a moment, it seemed the arts might return to Beacon Hill, but that hope proved short-lived. Governor Maura Healey’s 2024 Executive Order No. 631, Establishing a Cultural Policy Development Advisory Council, created the Cultural Policy Development Advisory Council (also known as the Cultural Economy Advisory Council), composed of twenty-nine individuals from local government, higher education institutions, nonprofits, arts organizations, planning councils, economic development agencies, and the business community. The full council convened four times over roughly one year and was tasked with providing recommendations to support the arts and foster economic opportunity for the sector.
The resulting list of five recommendations fulfilled the order. “The governor used the executive order to establish the Cultural Policy Development Council. It was charged with making a report. Once it was delivered, the body completed its role, and it was dissolved. Nothing further is expected of it,” Steiner, of the MCC, wrote in an email to BAR.
Because the council’s work was temporary by design and produced only a single report with general recommendations and no implementation plan, it cannot be considered a substitute for the council or network Patrick’s administration established.
The “number one recommendation [of the council] was to standardize the definition [of] ‘cultural economy.’ [It was to] map the cultural economy and standardize the definition,’” said David Slatery, the MCC’s acting executive director. “When we talk about the life sciences sector in Massachusetts, people have data. It’s collected at the state level; it’s reported that way. We know what it is,” he continued. “We need the independent, neutral organs of government and economic reporting services to agree [on] what the cultural economy is.” It’s unclear whether the council knew about the New England Council and Mt. Auburn Associates’ creative economy work and report from 2000, but in seemingly negating its existence, the Economic Advisory Council’s recommendations set the state’s work back by some thirty years.
The MCC, for its part, has been quick to distance itself from Healey’s council. “We took a large role in the governor’s Cultural Policy Development Advisory Council, but that was clearly her administration’s initiative. We staffed it, and we showed up, and we came out in force, but that was their effort,” Slatery said.
The most recent numbers on the Commonwealth’s arts sector come from the MCC’s 2024 Cultural Assets Inventory report, championed by Bobbitt. The report was not a part of the governor’s council. Intended to measure the size, scope, economic contributions, and needs of the state’s cultural sector, it identified 15,063 cultural organizations and programs and at least 112,191 individuals who earned most of their income from creative occupations, representing about 3 percent of the state’s workforce.
The project had lofty ambitions “to describe, understand, collaborate, and direct policy and support to individuals and organizations (for profit, nonprofit, government) that populate the state’s cultural sector,” the Cultural Assets Inventory report noted. However, “the end result did not necessarily produce data that can be used for decision-making or for any of the other goals,” according to Christina Turner, vice president of Programs and Grantmaking at the Cambridge Community Foundation, which contributed to the study. Worse, the report’s finding that the median (fiftieth percentile) annual income for Massachusetts artists (adults with no children) is $49,182—well below the state’s living wage of $58,011—signals existential dangers that no one seems to be confronting. What if jobs in the arts sector are bad jobs? What if investing in the arts is a drag on the state’s purse, not a boost?
The numbers reveal a bleak picture of working in the arts, with real consequences beyond those faced by starving artists. Under the Obama administration, a Department of Education audit of predatory student loans at for-profit universities also ensnared arts programs, including those at for-profit Art Institutes schools and Ivy League universities. It found, for example, that the average salary of a Harvard American Repertory Theater Institute graduate could not cover the loans these students had to borrow to pay for the program. After it received a failing grade for burdening students with high levels of debt, the Harvard program announced it would suspend admissions for the next three years. According to its website, the program is still on hiatus.
Under the Trump administration’s Education Department, a new earnings test for all university programs—not just those at for-profit schools, as during the Obama era—is set to “threaten almost half of graduate arts programs,” according to reporting by the New York Times. According to the guidelines, all master’s degree programs must now show that graduates’ median earnings exceed those of a working adult aged 25 to 34 with a bachelor’s degree, rather than a working adult with only a high school diploma. Schools whose alumni fail to meet this stricter threshold twice in three years risk losing the ability to accept students who rely on federal loans. And because artists typically earn less than the Education Department’s guidelines, arts programs, including those at the most prestigious universities, are in a particularly precarious position.
The choice in designing these reports is stark: Show numbers that narrowly define artistic labor and risk losing government support, or show inflated numbers by expanding the definition beyond the labor of cultural goods and services production to include jobs that feature creativity as a characteristic of the work being done—for example, computer programming and wearable tech—and risk losing credibility.

A chart comparing the sizes of the creative economy using different models, as illustrated in Defining the Creative Economy: Industry Occupational Approaches, a 2008 report by Ann Markusen, Gregory Wassall, Douglas DeNatale, and Randy Cohen. The chart highlights how different definitions of the creative economy across reports lead to radically different findings about the sector’s size, ranging from nearly 50 percent of the overall workforce to less than 2 percent.
“Whether you say it’s a $25 billion industry or a $29 billion industry, you’re making the same argument to the same [people], and the people who love the arts are supporting the arts, and the people who don’t buy it aren’t buying it,” said Slatery of the MCC. In his experience, he explained, data- and economics-inclined people tend to not believe the $25 to $29 billion figure because they believe that “the arts is quality of life. It’s not real. It’s a frill. It’s an extra. It’s not a core piece of our society,” much less “a business.”
The 2025 Otis Report, In the Shadow of the Pandemic Cliff, highlights that the end of pandemic-response American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) grants signals a significant drop-off in support for California arts institutions. Similar dynamics have been unfolding in Massachusetts. For example, Boston Mayor Michelle Wu has cut arts spending, citing a lack of funds and the end of ARPA programs. A 2026 MASSCreative survey of 125 arts and cultural organizations in New England found that these organizations lost at least $13.5 million in federal, state, foundation, and individual funding in 2025. The lack of a Massachusetts report comparable to the Otis Report makes it hard for arts leaders to sound the alarm or for policymakers to respond, as there is no data to support their claims.
Currently, the MCC is not planning a follow-up to its Cultural Assets Inventory report. It was a pet project of Bobbitt, who left the organization for OPERA America at the end of December 2025. Nearly a year after Bobbitt’s departure, a job listing for the new executive director was released in November 2026. “I’m an interim executive director. Maybe whenever they do a search, and we get a new executive director, we can really push that,” Slatery said. State arts advocacy nonprofit MASSCreative also does not produce economic impact reports. “We are not statisticians, and we’re not economists. But the other issue is that [if] MASSCreative put[s] out a report that says the creative economy in Massachusetts is generating $30 billion in revenue, no one will believe us because it benefits us to say that,” said Ruddock.
A New Cycle Beginning in Boston?
Locally, a new generation of leaders is more optimistic about the arts’ economic development potential. During a June Zoom call with a coalition of Massachusetts arts leaders, Joseph Zeal-Henry, Boston’s chief of arts and culture, said that his office surveyed 3,000 Boston residents and found that “18 [percent] to 19 percent of Bostonians say their primary income is also cultural. Further, 7 [percent] to 9 percent say [their] secondary income is cultural. So that’s almost one in four working-age Bostonians [who earn] their primary [or] secondary income from arts and culture.” It’s not clear what definition of “cultural” Zeal-Henry’s team used in the study, which returned such large results. Amid a weakening economy, federal policies that target the state’s economic pillars—education, medicine, and life sciences—and threats that AI will lead to mass job displacement, Massachusetts urgently needs an economic win. Could the arts, as Zeal-Henry contends, deliver that win?
The lack of consensus over whether to count goods and services produced through labor that can be characterized as creative, versus a narrower definition that counts only labor that produces cultural goods and services, gets at how the US economy has changed since Massachusetts’s first report in 1973. The evolution of the US economy from agriculture to a Fordist industrial base to a services and knowledge economy to today’s digital platform economy—and perhaps to a future AI-driven economy—means that failing to agree on a definition of the creative economy is a failure to respond to the way technological changes are driving societal and economic shifts that policy and cultural sector leaders must adapt to. As forms of labor and value creation in the broader economy become increasingly abstracted, what impact will this have on workforce participation—creative or otherwise?
Zeal-Henry believes that the arts industry can be that silver lining for jobs. “What we’re seeing in [some] forms of data is that the creative economy outperforms [the general] workforce. You can grow the financial services exponentially, but the people you need to do it drop. As you grow the creative economy, you grow the workforce at the same time. So, at a time when we’re really worried about disruption to labor and disruption to [the] workforce, it’s a really good sector to keep people employed,” he said during the June Zoom call.
“It gets back to those three priorities of legislators: jobs, jobs, and jobs,” said Randy Cohen, vice president of research at AFTA. Zeal-Henry’s office suffered significant cuts from Mayor Wu’s administration office this year, so without methodologically sound, trusted data to support Zeal-Henry’s claims, how can we know whether his framing of the arts and culture industry as a $15 billion industry is a viable path for economic development or just savvy political positioning?
Roughly every decade or so, the arts seem to be “rediscovered” as a major engine of the economy. Yet fifty-three years after Massachusetts’s first report, industry leaders still can’t agree on a definition of the creative economy, much less set a holistic cultural policy agenda to support it. Design theorists call such issues “wicked problems”— not for regional slang or because of a moral quality, but because the question is so intractable. The lack of progress underscores that, despite the US’s creative economy being worth an estimated $1.2 trillion, advocates for the sector, both nationally and in Massachusetts, have failed for decades to organize a constituency strong enough to pack a political punch.
Looking at the long arc of policy meant to support the creative economy in Massachusetts—and how local policy influenced policy at the national level—calls to mind what feels like the overarching theme of our present day: History doesn’t always move forward; it can also slide back.
—1 In 1998, NEFA published Economic Impact of the Not-for-profit Cultural Industry in Massachusetts, a report based on a 1996 study co-commissioned by the Massachusetts Cultural Council.
—2 CreativeGround was started by combining two previously formed databases, CultureCount and MatchBook.org, as well as publicly available data. According to NEFA, profiles on CreativeGround “are now user-updated and created.”





